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 „...’the more man controls anything, the more uncontrollable 
both become.’“ (Tyler 1986:123) 
 
 „The world exists to serve the glorification of God and for that 
purpose alone. The elected Christian is in the world only to 
increase this glory of God by fulfilling His commandments to 
the best of his ability. But God requires social achievement of 
the Christian because He wills that social life shall be organized 
according to his commandments...“ (Weber 1976:108 
 
Abstract 
This essay reflects on the possibility of a ‘total’ situation: various cultural tendencies, drives, 
intentions or processes, which aim to have ‘total’ control of a situation or a setting; totality 
being a state, with totalism an agenda or process. 
Striving for 100%, whether unlimited growth in capitalism, total control of something (like 
information) or over someone respectively ‘all’, is described as an imminent danger 
considering present-day technological possibilities, and ideological programs such as 
neoliberalism, or various politically totalist strivings. This has been discussed even by Max 
Weber’s critique of rationalism, Bataille’s critique of economy, or Zygmunt Bauman’s 
critique of the superpanopticon regarding surveillance. On the other hand, religions can be 
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understood as total systems demanding 100% belief and obedience from believers. Since they 
operate in ‘cultures’, they tend to influence or ‘color’ them with their tenets, and evangelical 
groups are a particularly aggressive contemporary phenomenon. 
 
Keywords  
Totality, neoliberalism, religio-economic nexus, political economy, surveillance, nation state, 
global rule, religious fundamentalism 
 
Firstly, I would like to clarify the difference between totalism and totalitarianism. For totality, 
I consider a total state of affairs or things, like ‘100% pure sugar’, life-sentence imprisonment, 
the death penalty, or a community’s total population instead of dealing with just a part of it; I 
perceive totalism as paths or endeavors to this end. That is, totalism is going all the way, or, I 
should say, it tries to do so because it will have to deal with difficulty in concrete social 
situations. Thus, it is an idea and an ideal adopted by persons, who may be possessed by it. 
I use the term totalism by focusing various cultural tendencies, drives, intentions or processes, 
which aim to have ‘total’ control of a situation or a setting; totality being a state, with totalism 
an agenda or process. This may be economic – whether a monopoly, political control, or 
something else. All of this means ‘100%’, either factually, as an intention, or as an unintended 
result – at a certain place, a certain time. Each of these ‘total’ (or not quite total) states of 
affairs is relative and historical, of course. 
This brings to mind theoretical predecessors, such as Mauss’s Le fait social total (The Total 
Social Fact), which in some cases “keep a society and its institutions going in their 
totality“ (Mauss 1978, II:137; my emphasis). According to Mauss, it is an exchange system 
affecting cohesion of the entire culture and in current sociology Le fait social total has been 
interpreted as a contribution to “dynamic sociology” (or anthropology) (Farrugia 2006:216f.), 
society continuously reproducing itself (and culture-specific cognition) („auto-produite“ – 
ibid.216). Yet, Mauss’s dynamic notion of the total social fact has to be understood in the 
light of critique of static French structuralism (ibid.217), as it shows that his totality differs 
from the one discussed here: a (global) totality and its implications from which there is no 
escape. 
Even the most totalitarian (state) tyranny is not really ‘100%’: there are always aspects arising 
from the total situation in the complex field of a lifeworld, such as deviating sections or 
individuals of the population, and some authors think that a total state of affairs cannot exist, 
that it will not be possible to create it.  
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Capitalism, as the globally dominant economic order, claims the necessity of constant 
economic expansion, a permanent process that may be understood as a totalist attitude. There 
is widespread criticism of this ideology, and Bataille’s argument (2001:53ff.) seems 
appropriate here: limits of the ‘biosphere’, our globe, means limits to growth and the question 
arises: What happens if we arrive at these limits? We cannot yet count on inhabiting or 
colonizing extra-terrestrial space. Quantitatively substantial human expansion into space is 
not foreseeable in the near future, but it can be considered philosophically or cosmologically. 
The terrestrial biosphere, taken as a unit of 100% (a totality), sets limits to human, or 
capitalist, kinds of permanent, unlimited or ‘eternal’ growth. So, for the present purpose I will 
classify totalism as a striving for total states of affairs
1
, and in so doing I shall draw from/on 
US ethnographic settings, since it is from here that novel processes pointing to globally 
relevant totalism frequently emerge, whether it is through economic drives, hegemonic 
tendencies, or informational totalism (surveillance). Additionally, we have a corpus of social 
research starting from the times of Max Weber, connecting such processes with religion. 
In turning to totalism in a concrete way, for instance, in political settings, we encounter 
extreme situations that may generate extreme interpretations. Therefore, it may be wise to 
consider George Marcus’s work on paranoia (1999) and discussing conspiracy, which is often 
utilized if extreme processes tend to be enigmatic. 
 
While there are not many explicit studies on totalism, much research has been made on 
totalitarianism. In defining it, one realizes that borders and delimitations are fluid, as, for 
instance, Abraham & van Schendel have convincingly shown in a study on licit and illicit 
flows across borders (2005:8, and passim). In showing the situatedness and relativity of legal 
and illegal processes, of what is criminal and what is not, their anthropological perspective 
seems, by analogy, to prove the impossibility of any ‘total’ situation. There are economic 
studies, too, investigating illegal practices, as seen, for instance, in the context of monopolies 
and neoliberalism (van Horn 2009:223, 229). In the course of their argument, Abraham & van 
Schendel also touch upon the subject of failed states, “the inability of a state to meet its 
security and welfare goals” (ibid.21). This seems to be the opposite of total state control but, 
as an abstract argument, would a failed state be a total situation, the opposite of total state 
control? Or, does it just mean somebody else in power, such as the rule of anarchic groups or 
individuals? Whenever one tries to apply such ideas in concrete ethnographic situations, as 
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 Even though there is a kind of parallelism, the telos of totalism here is not the same as that in Nietzsche (cf. 
Gebhard 1983:5f.), who, in his philosophy, took it as a perspective, a view, or comprehension  of all things.  
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Abraham & van Schendel have done, it seems there are no total situations, which may be true, 
but I believe we are frequently confronted with endeavors to implement total situations, by 
various actors, whether political, religious, or economic. One such endeavour is the present 
trend towards total surveillance, “fluid surveillance“, as it is called by some (Bauman & Lyon 
2013), or the striving for empire (Hardt & Negri 2002). 
In the case of the nation, state totalitarianism has some more ingredients: while it agrees with 
totalism with regard to a state of 100%, or the striving for it, it has some political, religious, 
and economic agendas aiming not just to reach the total state but to do so by controlling 
human beings, which is not necessarily the case with totalism. While the operational target 
unit of totalitarianism is the human being, or all human beings in its influence zone, in 
totalism it may be some commodity, or all commodities. The type of control in totalism can 
be in the markets or some specific commodity of economy (a monopoly); in religion (some 
religions claim to be monopolies, and religion agrees with totalitarianism in having the human 
being as target), including the sanctioning of difference (like totalizing power strategies, such 
as torture (Crapanzano 2004:88f.)
2
); the death penalty, for non-believers of a religion; or 
‘complete’ political control. So, what would be ‘total’, according to Morris, discussing 
Derrida, is the exclusion of difference (Morris 2007:364), which does not seem possible in 
praxis, however. 
The case of total institutions is somewhat different: they may be small or big, but I do not 
focus on single, individual institutions here. Instead, I look at the total state of a larger unit, 
such as that of a nation state, a field comprising numerous institutions, groups, clusters and 
perhaps religions of all kinds. However, to understand this, focus on a limited field, such as a 
religious group, a global economic player, or a secret service institution, is useful as an 
analytical tool. 
Erving Goffman (1962) had dealt with the topic of ‘total institutions’ prior to Foucault 
(1994:295ff.), and he describes them as a sociologist: they are experienced as total situations 
for their ‘inmates’, whether in prisons, homes for the elderly and the blind, and so forth. Yet 
this setting of control and being in the hands of other humans in such institutions still strongly 
resembles situations and processes of modernity, whereas, for instance, Lyon (2008:141ff.) 
discusses differences between modern and postmodern surveillance. One aspect of the latter is 
its pervasiveness, its omnipresence, while, in Goffman’s case (and in Foucault’s, too), these 
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 There are totalizing strategies in torture, such as the silence, or silencing of the victim (in order that the victim 
must be able, always (=100%), to hear what torturers say or ask (cf. Oberdiek 2000:80f., 86), or else, silence in 
the absence of complaining. In initiations, for instance, it is a required proof of bravery in enduring pain, and it 
has been reported that, after torture, the ability of the victim to speak has been destroyed, which is a totality in 
itself. 
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institutions were clearly delimited enclaves in the whole of a society.
3
 Enclaves of a similar 
kind, that is, totalisms in delimited fields, are presently being studied by Wacquant (2013), 
whose control institutions of deviant humans are situated in quasi-postmodern settings but do 
not discuss an overall totality. Like Goffman and Foucault, Wacquant focuses on particular 
total institutions constituting a sub-unit of a whole, such as a state. A postmodern 
technological-electronic complete and over-all surveillance, which is global and not only of 
particular institutions, is termed ‘superpanopticon’ by Lyon (2008:147). This would designate 
a totality, however hypothetical, of surveillance discussed as an idea, which is not the same as 
the factual (impending) totality I have in mind, however impossible that may be, but I think it 
is important to ventilate this issue because of its imminent danger for all. 
In totalitarianism, the means of violence and coercion, the power to sanction, are integral. It is, 
as we know, the concomitant of rule and power. Other than in ‘modern’ settings described by 
Foucault, present-day totalizing strategies and the means to influence and to manifest totalism 
are often more indirect and, as Bauman and Lyon (2013) stress, ‘soft’ methods are a 
characteristic of current and postmodern ‘fluid surveillance’. 
The numerous contributions to the research of totalitarianism cannot all be discussed here, so 
a few remarks must suffice. In her study on The origins of totalitarianism (1966), Hannah 
Arendt refers to the global outreach of countries  (ibid. 415). Such states never lose sight of 
their visions of “conquering the globe” (ibid.), but Arendt discusses the whole issue rather 
closely along the lines of what had happened in her immediate past – the two World Wars and 
Nazism – and does not focus on totalitarianism in a very general, or more theoretical way. 
Additionally, and in a certain way, Horkheimer and Adorno’s classic, the Dialectic of 
enlightenment (1969) has some intriguing ideas to contribute, which I shall discuss later. 
The setting for the present purpose is somewhat different: Can one say that the US nation-
state as such is striving to ‘conquer the world’? Is it really hegemonic, or even imperialistic, 
or is it only segments, certain corporations, for instance, guided by economic theory, that 
strive for global control (a grip that is predominantly economic but which would enslave all 
other spheres as we know since the rise of neoliberalism)? This would be very plausible if we 
consider the “disembeddedness” of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005; Polanyi 2001:XXIIIf.), and 
its hierarchy with itself on top, to which all other spheres are subservient.  
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 A number of papers by historians, based on Goffman’s model, have analyzed total institutions of the limited 
kind Goffman had presented in a special issue of the Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, Vol. 
8,1.2008: monasteries (Schneider 2008), mental asylums (Heidegger 2008), poor houses (Part 2008), border 
policemen (Sälter 2008), and the “non-historicity” of such institutions (Bretschneider 2008),. Especially in the 
last paper, Bretschneider claims that one should dismiss Goffman’s argument of total institutions as a general 
statement for historical science, and that instead one should try to understand its time-related bias (social protest, 




Since totalism, culturally, may be very well connected with the idea of purity, the striving for 
a pure state (which, like totalism, can be described as 100%, purity (like politically and 
ideologically motivated genocides, or described religiously, as in, the right religion, the 
ideologically right way of life) is worthy of inclusion in the analysis. So, purity often applies 
to religious and sometimes political settings, and, for the latter, the undertones of 
totalitarianism tend to be stronger than they are in the religious setting. Here, one may point 
to a theoretical ‘confluence’ of religion and economy, namely, Max Weber’s and Walter 
Benjamin’s framings of capitalism: that modern capitalism emerged out of religion, according 
to Weber, and that capitalism is understood as religion by Benjamin, respectively (cf. Baecker 
2009). 
However, metamorphoses of this kind do not happen all of a sudden but can be identified only 
over long periods of time. Such a process has been described by Max Weber: the 
metamorphosis from Protestant belief and piety in to modern capitalism. In a quite similar 
context, neo-liberalism, Mirowski (2013:13) writes while focusing on the difficulty of tracing 
changes of this type: “Ideas have a nasty habit of transubstantiating as they wend their way 
throughout the space of discourse...”, 
Even though there has been mission in Catholicism since its early days in the age of discovery 
in the Old World and overseas due to norms stated in the bible (St. Matthew 28,18-20), it has 
become fiercer with the Reformation and Protestant groups
4
. Remember Girolamo Savonarola 
(1452-1498), the Dominican monk whose religious order is devoted to preaching and 
defending their faith, and who had been preaching his doctrine of purity in the 1490s in 
Florence, in the face of decadent Medici rule and the libertine common lifestyle. He was 
outraged by the decadence of the people and the clergy and recruited an ‘army’ of boys who 
trawled the streets of Florence to extract donations, which were both voluntarily given and 
coerced, for his religious purpose. At that time and for a little later, several preachers 
appeared in Europe, creating movements, aiming, like Savonarola, at ‘reform’: what they 
conceived as pure and their opposition to ‘decadent’ life. Martin Luther held Savonarola in 
high esteem, and a little later other reformers, such as Calvin, appeared on the religious scene 
in order to ‘regulate’ the lives of the people. 
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 Horkheimer & Adorno (1969:21) characterize it as “the militant religiosity of the more recent epoch of 
Torquemada, Luther, Muhammad”. 
 7 
Many of those who disagreed with established religion, whether Catholic or Protestant, also 
migrated to America. These ‘dissenters’, departing from the traditional religious fold, and 
Protestant groups were summarily termed Puritans by others. In the New World, they 
developed peculiar forms, different from European avenues of thought and action, and they 
have been a focus of interest for social scientists and historians, from Max Weber and his 
contemporaries to Barbalet (2008), De la Fuente (2004) and others, for more than a hundred 
years. 
So, what evangelicals, being current offshoots of Protestant strivings, say and want to 
implement and organize for everyone, according to theological dictum, is revelation-based 
and thus irrefutable. This biblical ideology applies to the various other Christian groupings as 
well: they will not rest until all mankind has been converted, because there is the above-
mentioned sentence in the Bible to this end – it is a 100% end, and should simultaneously be 
the end of all other religions; the formulation, which is attributed to Jesus, starts with his 
statement of having “all power/violence” (St. Matthew 28,18-20), which sounds dangerous. 
This is a strong statement and position. 
It agrees with the statement in Revelation (7.4-8) concerning 144,000 just people from certain 
tribes, who will finally be in heaven – all others will go to hell. This grotesque statement, 
which may have been very ‘rational’ 2000 years ago, following the best available ‘knowledge’ 
at that time, must be contextualized in the Near-Eastern mind and speculations made of that 
remote time and place, from a current and central European perspective. Biblical revelations 
and cognate things, like ‘God has told them’ to do, cannot be questioned. This totalism comes 
in the garb of belief, and because it is religious and not discursive, it has to be accepted: one 
cannot argue, and belief is extolled as a positive virtue. Only another ‘revelation’ can oppose 
or top it, which would actually mean combat. Such revelations enable and empower all kinds 
of manipulation, both personal and group. There is no way out: the ideological demand here is 
total, for 100%, and adherents of this idea will not rest until they have achieved it. This 
cultural construction creates a constant source of unrest and the opposite of peace, and of 
letting things be as they are. The believers will not let people have their way: everyone has to 
conform to their belief. This is the believers’ conviction, which, in strong, embodied practices 
during evangelical services, is supported and strengthened: part of their power drive is the 
inclusion of the activated, accelerated body. The tendency of evangelical striving is, 
‘physiologically’ stated to propel the body’s velocity, so to speak, until it has gathered the 
speed of an ecstatic bullet and penetrates (and therefore intrudes, injures or kills) otherness, 
first in the evangelical person, then in other persons. It aims to conquer and dominate 
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everything, and in confronting non-believers, their methods, in the wake of postmodernism, 
have become less crude and more fluid. The vision and drive is geared toward a pure state of 
being. The only problem is that the conservative, Middle Eastern, two thousand year-old 
content of this vision and its cultural messages are highly neurotic and violently power-
oriented, meaning the result of their application will be a disaster, as has been the case so far. 
We have witnessed the effects of Christendom for a long time and we know from experience, 
approximately, what will happen. However, since evangelicals and fundamentalist Christians, 
as an ideal type, are generally averse to knowledge of a secular kind, such as history, for 
example, and to events that have happened (which amounts to anti-intellectualism), and 
instead focus on narrow scriptural belief enhanced by their body practices, such minds are not 
receptive to the experiences diverse human cultures have gone through. 
In the eyes of Christian fundamentalists, there has to be acceptance of their belief. What adds 
to the complexity is that their demands are often addressed to people who themselves (at least 
those in the USA) have been raised in Christian ways. So, there is cognate soil making it more 
difficult for those approached to refuse such demands, because they sound familiar and 
acceptable. It is also true that some people, who are familiar with the strategies of 
fundamentalists, can be their harshest critics. On the other hand, newcomers to the religious 
mix, propagated by evangelicals in parts of Asia, Africa and South America, may experience 
this new exposure as exotic, tempting and so, consequently, and because of material promises, 
they may embrace it.  
 
Totalism and society 
Even though Puritans pursuing an extreme path were themselves originally ‘dissenters’ from 
the religious mainstream, evangelicals today nevertheless hunt down those deviating from 
their path, and persecuting deviance has found avenues of action beyond the religious sphere, 
particularly in the USA. Attempts to eliminate deviance, or otherness, may be understood as a 
trend at majorification, the ‘complete’ majority being total, so to speak. Historically, in the 
USA, researching and combatting deviance has been important for religious and political 
reasons of control. Such activity has been directed against alcohol, gangs, communists, 
control of prostitution, and even the deviance of skin color. Studies of deviant behavior in 
sociology and anthropology have seen one remarkable trend since the early 20th century, 
when scholars of the Chicago School (Anderson 1923; Thrasher 1927, and others, cf. Hannerz 
1980) presented their studies. These studies were often financed by social agencies to protect 
young people, safeguard city life, or gather structural intelligence concerning deviant groups. 
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They have generated knowledge about deviance in order to control the public sphere. History 
shows that what did not fit into the mainstream has historically been identified, researched, 
and, in some cases, hunted down with a vengeance, because mainstream is regarded as a 
“patriotic” duty, like in the case of sex offenders (Wacquant 2013:222; cf. also Versluis 2006). 
One of the most famous ‘witch hunts’ has been the McCarthy process of persecuting 
communists in the country, and Wacquant reports a current trend for hunts in the course of 
new punishment strategies following neoliberal logic in the US (2013:222 and passim). 
The US mainstream has long been ‘White Anglo-Saxon Protestant’ (WASP), which holds a 
majorly dominant, historical and current cultural, political and economic influence in the USA. 
It is a formula that includes a place of origin and a religious orientation. I say it is dominant 
insofar as power, capital and domination of the public scene are mainly controlled by this 
cultural influence in institutions, corporations, public office, and communication channels. 
Additionally, it is dominated by relatively few interconnected, very rich families: an elite 
(Marcus 1992, 1983), whose members control most of the capital in the country (Bauman 
2013; Keister 2011), even though there are singular exceptions of all kinds to this general, 
dominant trend. This organizational and functional cluster is complemented by another, as 
described by Kapferer (2005) and which Nonini (2005) has termed a “cleptocratic oligarchy”, 
wherein individuals, supported by the ruling neoliberal ideology, switch from CEO positions 
in companies to government posts and back, securing personal or family gains to the 
disadvantage of the public, a process that may be characterized as corrupt action. These 
individual agents are frequently owners of big corporations, or members of the 
aforementioned elite families, favoring legislation profitable to their corporations while in 
public office, which amounts to theft of public property: for example, in cases of privatization. 
These cases, and particularly the “Neoliberal Thought Collective” (Mirowski 2013), form 
trends of totalism. Before considering this further, I will briefly mention another complex 
study in the history of ideas, which, although being philosophical, nevertheless utilizes 
anthropological thought and material in a remarkable way. 
Horkheimer and Adorno, in their Dialectics of Enlightenment (1986), which was first 
published in 1944, point to a transformation of puritanism, possibly reflecting the Weber 
thesis of some thirty years prior,  stating that puritanism’s inherent totalist drive is no longer 
the relevant totalist drive, but instead this would be the economy, leaving no chance for the 
consumer to escape
5
. In this way, but without mentioning it, these two authors basically adopt 
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 “Entscheidend ist heute nicht mehr der Puritanismus, obwohl er in Gestalt der Frauenorganisationen immer 
noch sich geltend macht, sondern die im System liegende Notwendigkeit, den Konsumenten nicht auszulassen, 
ihm keinen Augenblick die Ahnung von der Möglichkeit des Widerstands zu geben.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 
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the position of Weber’s iron cage, even though they did not connect the two realms, 
puritanism (i.e. religion), the totalist drive of economy (which stands for Enlightenment) and 
the western scientific principle in general, which they aimed to ‘disenchant’ by showing that 
it would revert to myth. Horkheimer and Adorno’s referral to totalism6 has its origin in 
philosophical thought, namely G.W.F Hegel, when they discuss, in the first part of their work, 
actually ‘primordial’ anthropological questions of relations of magic (and art, ‘images’ vs. 
writing/language in Western cultures) and belief and knowledge, and in doing so they utilize 
anthropologists’ works of that time. Starting from the mana principle, they follow up stages of 
human changes, up to Western scientific principles (as if it these formed one coherent line), 
such as mathematics, and, currently, economic totality, instead of the earlier totality of images 
and signs that used to explain and legitimate the course of things, or processes of nature. 
While an image, or a myth, stood for, or was the totality of the world, discursive processes 
took them apart, but, followed to their consequential end, were totalist themselves, and thus 
‘myth’ again (1986:21, 25).  
How does this relate to my argument of totalism? Horkheimer and Adorno (ibid. 25) based 
theirs on the contradiction by Hegel, who, according to them, fell victim to mythology 
himself by making the totality in “system and history” absolute. While these processes of 
thought (and, thus, interpretations) and framings of history, or ‘what happens’, are rather 
loosely connected to factual events and configurations, my own approach is much more 
‘materialistically’ based, starting from concrete processes, declared goals, intentions of actors, 
or direct results of processes. Decisive in judging it as totalist is its trend toward that end, and 
this judgment is arrived at inductively. An example of this is the theft of SIM card codes from 
the Dutch SIM card manufacturer, Gemalto, by the American National Security Agency, NSA, 
and the British Secret Service, GCHQ, as reported by the media in February 2015. It has been 
reported that this theft pertains to about 50% of all SIM cards, which may now be hacked by 
these Secret Services without anyone noticing. So, even though only 50% of cards are 
controlled now, the other 50% do not seem out of reach, and this clearly points to a process of 
totalism, for which we do not have to go back to Hegel. It is tendencies and facts of this kind 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1986:127). This statement will have to be modified in the face of current evangelical and other religious 
tendencies. 
6
 Starting from ‘primordial’ states taken from anthropological literature, like the mana principle, the two authors 
claim totality for the arts, too, and continue to the interpretation of modern identity, as determined by 
Enlightenment, the scientific principle, etc.: “Als Ausdruck der Totalität beansprucht Kunst die Würde des 
Absoluten.” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1986:21). Furthermore, proceeding to the occidental history of ideas: “Mit 
dem Begriff der bestimmten Negation hat Hegel ein Element hervorgehoben, das Aufklärung von dem 
positivistischen Zerfall unterscheidet, dem er sie zurechnet. Indem er freilich das gewußte Resultat des gesamten 
Prozesses der Negation: die Totalität in System und Geschichte, schließlich doch zum Absoluten machte, 
verstieß er gegen das Verbot und verfiel selbst der Mythologie.” (Ibid.:25; my emphasis). 
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that I use when talking about totalism. 
I am not concerned with Horkheimer and Adorno’s deterministic vision of the total situation, 
which is inescapable according to them. Inescapability has also been hinted at, albeit with a 
caveat, and not as radically but rather carefully and bound to sociological fact, by Weber. 
Horkheimer and Adorno ingeniously concretize their vision of the present age in Homer’s 
epic story, Ulysses (ibid.: 34ff.), but my aim is to analyze and decipher present dangers of 
total surveillance and control, as Mirowski has done in demystifying strategies of neoliberals 
(Mirowsky 2013). Despite Horkheimer and Adorno’s ingenious monument, invoking 
inescapability (art being the only feature in this situation that makes life ’easier’)7, there are 
numerous spaces and tendencies offering escapes from their scenario.  
 
Exemplifying totalist drives ethnographically 
In dealing with totalist drives more concretely, I will first turn to a (seemingly!) rather simple, 
tangible and down-to-earth ethnographic case of totalizing. It is the Anglicized background of 
a dominant piece of American culture that originates in British food, which, according to 
general consensus, is not classed as gourmet cooking, nor is it on par with, say, French, Italian 
or Chinese cuisine, or the extravagant and excellent use of spices in Indian cooking. Instead, a 
British meal traditionally consists of a piece of meat, preferably beef, something like mashed 
potatoes, brown (or some other color) sauce, and perhaps some deep-frozen peas on the side
8
. 
In America, this type of food of the British settlers, which was perhaps somewhat influenced 
and transformed by the culinary dearth of the days of the expansion into the Western Reserve, 
has been ingeniously industrialized and normalized, following the processes of the Fordian 
assembly line of automobile production (Henry Ford’s conveyor belt being a model (Bauman 
2013:80)), to become what has been termed McDonaldized (Ritzer 1993), which, again, 
points to a 100% model, an attempt at perfection and maximized profit in this technological 
sub-sphere of the project of modernity (cf. Bauman 2013:79f.). So, food of the British 
culinary tradition, has, in America, been processed, made durable –  and thus more profitable 
– by industrial means, as with canned products and their long shelf lives being economically 
prepared and maximized and exported everywhere. Restaurants of this type (ie. fast food), 
meanwhile, are cherished around the world – not for the quality of their food, but as a status 
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 “Das Kulturgut [die Kunst] steht zur kommandierten Arbeit [die totale Realität der modernen Welt] in genauer 
Korrelation, und beide gründen im unentrinnbaren Zwang zur gesellschaftlichen Herrschaft über die Natur.” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1986:34). This totalist vision might be relativized, or ‘softened’ by an anthropological 
perception of human life by stressing the fact and necessity of survival or subsistence, which, in the end, of 
course, has to be achieved somehow, and there are many avenues… This does not have to be a totalist 
“gesellschaftliche Herrschaft über die Natur”. 
8
 In case you want to be sure about this, you may search, as a case in point, the recipe for ‘Windsor Soup’. 
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symbol and meeting point, particularly in cities of South America and Asia. This drive, or 
strategy, of the protagonists of this business model, to me, presents a case of totalizing in 
effect: it aims at, or points to, a total state, at least. 
Another level of the Anglocized food realm is the ecological dimension (the production of its 
raw materials, agricultural production),which shows analogous characteristics: monoculture, 
uniform sizes, pesticides, genetic manipulation, monopolizing seeds – all of which aim at 
higher output – that is, profit – and economic activities and logic create and enforce this type 
of production worldwide. 
 
A second ethnographic case, or symptomatic complex, is manifesting in American movies: in 
just about every other American film, people find themselves in courts, trying to rectify 
things. They are struggling with the peculiarities of American positive law and its monopoly 
of violence, and try to obey it or prove their innocence in numerous cases of accusation and 
detention. This nightmare of being in court all the time, of having to report to judges, seems 
to mirror a guilt complex (or trauma?) deriving from American juridical culture, and it 
certainly also mirrors evangelical ritual practice to confess one’s ‘sins’ in public services, and 
to declare one’s born-again status. While Padderatz (2007:30) interprets this as a strategy of 
sensationalism and propaganda employed by those dominating the public in order to stultify 
the people, one may ask whether it can be traced to religious culture, or the historical fact that 
early settlers did not yet have an established juridical system and so were forced to deal with 
juridical questions personally (and perhaps with their guns). I would argue that both causes 
have repercussions, with the religious cause having the stronger of the two. Recently, 
Wacquant (2013) has studied the guilt-offence-policing-deviance complex in the US in a 
class-specific way. 
However, on the other hand, Nederveen Pieterse (2003:100) attributes the court-mania to 
American constitutionalism, the structure being a “legal-rational culture” (ibid.), which would 
amount to a (historical) rational-technical interpretation (checks and balances), a pattern of 
explanation that may also apply, without having to be the only factor. In a (voluntarily) rather 
weak state, the law takes a superior position in order to regulate affairs. My own 
interpretation, however, focuses on value commitments behind such ‘court-seeking’ behavior. 
Nederveen Pieterse (2003:101) rightly stresses the existence of a certain impotence of 
international American policy, and the possibility to pass progressive laws because of the 
powerful grip of local, special groups’ interests on Congress decisions, even though he has 
asked, reflecting on mainly political US influence (ibid.:93), whether, for those that become 
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tangible internationally (in trends emanating from the USA), a “basic or foundational 
dynamic is at work”. So, there seems to be a technical-structural condition leading to 
American policy, too, but we may look at those local-particular interests to find value 
decisions, and even religiously motivated decisions behind them. Here, an anthropological 
perspective is, in my view, well suited to inquire into such affairs, since, as an anthropologist, 
one may include any necessary context serving the outcome statements, without too many 
confining methodological constraints. 
At this point, the question of democracy comes in: Is the United States really a democratic 
political entity? Quite a few analysts negate this. Greider (cited in Beck 2003:101) attests to a 
depraved state of US-democracy: non-participation in elections, problems and dubious ways 
of financing elections, and only brief and shallow political statements by politicians to satisfy 
media formats. One may also refer on the principle of kleptocracy (the nexus of personnel 
switches between corporations and government positions) combined with neo-liberal ideology 
(Nonini 2005) to acknowledge a desolate state of American politics and democracy, or the 
‘rule’ of neoliberal economy. Does the USA (or, rather, major trends in that country) drift 
from what Buruma & Margalit (2004, following Sombart 1915) would have termed a “liberal 
democracy”, with its logic of soft and “comfortist: merchant values and aims of life9, to 
become a dominant culture of heroism? The latter may be classified as out-dated in dominant 
the present-day lifestyles pursued in western or industrial countries. 
 
This short excursus on democracy and heroism leads me to consider a third ethnographic case 
– another cultural complex that can be connected with totalism – namely, heroism in films. In 
movies, there are repercussions from the lack of securities in the American way of life, calling 
for heroes that save. This type of heroism is born from weaknesses, the need to be protected; 
it is a call for helpers in desparate situations, where no hope is in sight, to help, but heroism in 
the USA also has other strands feeding it, machismo being one. Yearning for the help of 
redeemers, saviours in difficult situations may create self-assurance, and this is affirmed in 
constructs like Superman, involving various sorts of heroes. These cultural productions have 
the calming ingredient portraying forces that guarantee that things are going well, as seen in 
                                                        
9
 “Liberal democracy is the political system most suited to merchant peoples. It is a competitive system in which 
different parties contend, and in which conflicts of interest can be solved only through negotiation and 
compromise. It is by definition unheroic, and thus, in the eyes of its detractors, despicably wishy-washy, 
mediocre, and corrupt.” (Buruma & Margalit 2004:55). Such distinct and determinist categorizations by these 
two authors remind us of bygone days in anthropology, when ‘the culture’ of the XY was stated as a timeless 
given (or as distinct and rather uniform in major traits), so we have to be careful here. However, Buruma and 
Margalit may only have cited Sombart’s view, formed one hundred years ago when this way of proceeding was 
common. Given the many different streams or strands of endeavors in present-day America, we can only say that 
the heroic vein is just one, albeit a strong one, and we cannot be sure whether its influence will become stronger. 
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fairy tales, or Disneyland, for example: they deliver us from nightmares. Such cultural dreams 
seem to be helpful for feeling personally more secure in the face of widespread rampage, 
‘conquista’ of the person (mainly economical), robbery and ruthless occupation. Additionally, 
it involuntarily affirms or reveals states of being that make people feel unsafe: economically, 
politically and culturally. 
 
The fourth and most pressing example is the march of neoliberalism towards total control: of 
everything and throughout the economic realm. This is structurally related to my brief 
excursus on Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1986) grand and pessimistic construct of the course 
of human affairs, from magic to science (and the latter’s involuntary but inescapably totalist 
telos, as sketched above). One may notice an evolutionistic tone in their model, but this is not 
necessarily the case. The text was written at the time of the emergence of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, the founding organization of neoliberalism (Mirowsky 2013) that superseded 
classical economic ideology. In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, Mirowsky analyzes the 
performance and strategies of neoliberalism (the ‘Neoliberal Thought Collective’, or NTC),  
comprising various authors, organizations, think tanks, etc.), and identifies three neoliberal 
strategies – short, medium and long-range – to achieve their goal (other or new markets), in 
response to whatever happens.  
Interestingly, Mirowski develops his argument of neoliberal totalism by using the biosphere, 
and this reminds us of Bataille’s statements on the totality of the biosphere, as mentioned 
above. To dismantle neoliberal strategy, he uses the example of global ecological policy: 
global warming and CO
2
 emissions, and the resulting instrument of trading carbon permits 
(much to the delight of the NTC, since it means more markets and diverts attention from the 
problem itself, and does not solve it). In the case of global warming, the NTC complex 
applies three strategies:  
1. Short-term: science-denialism = denying its man-made origin and with this message 
influencing the media scene;  
2. medium-range = favoring carbon permit trading, which does not solve the problem;  
3. Long-term policies = geoengineering) (Mirowski ibid.:337).  
Similarly, in the case of general economics and neoliberal trends, there are three strategies:  
1. Denying that the economic crisis of 2008 was due to faulty economics;  
2. „market-based rescue of banks“ (ibid. 343) as a response; 
3. ‘Financial innovation’, the long-term answer, which involves finding always new financial 
mechanisms (and consequently market mechanisms) to deal with what has happened.  
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Because of a quasi-metaphysical neoliberal conviction, the ‘omnicient’ market, the course of 
events cannot be fully understood by humans, but the market always (and naturally) moves in 
directions that are right; humans have to be patient and observe where it moves. It seems to be 
the perfect agent:  
“Neoliberal doctrine maintains that anyone should be free to propound any wonky falsehood 
they may wish, because the final arbiter of truth is the market...” (Ibid. 338)  
According to Mirowski, neoliberals count on “…the dynamic and chaotic character of nature 
and society and the immutable solidity of the market…” (ibid. 342). This makes their attitude 
and expectation dynamic and strong, and probably much more akin to ‘life’ than any fix 
system, and hardly refutable, also. So “…neoliberals [did] come through the [economic] crisis 
stronger than ever…” (ibid.356), contrary to opinions that this ideology shows a downward 
trend. Following Mirowski’s interpretation, all of this amounts to an “industrial-scale 
manufacture of ignorance about the crisis“ (ibid. 357), and he asks for some agenda to counter 
it. This will certainly not be an easy task, considering the mind power of the neoliberal 
movement, from Hayek in the 1940s to present times. 
 
So, what can we glean from these theoretical considerations and ethnographical cases? I have 
outlined one cultural case of totalism, or trend towards economic monopolism (food, in the 
US), two cultural cases of ‘coping’ with pressures of totalist (or extreme trends in society 
surfacing in US movies showing some religious background or features (eg. confessions in 
courts, heroes as saviours, etc.)), and one globally active, theoretically based and strategically 
shrewd and successful movement (neoliberalism), which has been aimed at ‘the whole’ for 
about half a century. 
Thinking of ‘being witness’ to the courts, striving for totality in economics (monopoly and the 
maximization of profit, as seen in the food industry), or saviour heroes in the film industry, 
one may see patterns that previously existed in religion and are still practice now. For 
example, confessing in evangelical services, striving for total, or complete belief (and 
spreading this belief everywhere), and the neoliberal belief in the omniscient ‘saviour’ of the 
market. In the American cultural field, there has always been the direct cultural feedback from 
institutions of religion, anchoring seemingly secular drives to the direct drive of religion, 
thereby assuring its roots and continuing the connection. Let’s not forget that there is the 
figure of salvation on top, or, as a last resort, in the garb of heroes rescuing people from all 
kinds of secular situations of dire need, aside from the institution of religious salvation. So, 
these secular trends may well have their backgrounds set in earlier forms of religion. What 
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typically takes place in the US field of politics and public thought, both belief and action, is 
the shifting or transposing of quasi (or formerly) religious constructs of ‘knowledge’ (ie. 
coping with contingency) to the modern realm of materiality. It is the changing of an actual 
pre-modern corpus of habitus into the technologically advanced settings of the 20th and 21st 
centuries. And this harbors danger, conflict, and, of course, violence. As the presently most 
dangerous single trend among these, I would class neoliberal trends, and, secondly, the 
evangelical challenge. 
The other point is more abstract, but it may become very material at any time: states declare 
war on other states in order to protect their own citizens, or, they do so for reasons of robbery, 
land annexure and the like. This follows a seemingly “natural and justified” intrastate logic 
(Derrida 2001:84f.), but what if, after processes of globalization, only one ‘state’ is left? In 
this single and therefore structurally ‘total’ state, there cannot be extra-state enemies, and we 
can only hope that there will be intrastate mechanisms within (and in my view, not 
necessarily outside, beyond or ‘above’) the juridical system that control, renew and reform it. 
As things are, there is continuity. The new law will be generated out of earlier systems, one 
out of the other: it is not possible to “un-inherit” our past (Abeysekara 2008:2f.).  
So, in the absence of different states, if only one is left, a unified juridical system cannot be 
‘fraudulent’ any more by attacking other states, and, if this new omnisystem is consistent, 
what will be its ‘other’ possible critic, or even enemy? Will individual citizens and/or 
institutions, corporations be the only ones capable of overthrowing it, and will they be natural 
enemies of the state? How far will governmental institutions go to combat the people? Will 
they strive for total control? 
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